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Introduction: We propose that active Bayesian inference—a general framework for
decision-making—can equally be applied to interpersonal exchanges. Social cognition,
however, entails special challenges. We address these challenges through a novel
formulation of a formal model and demonstrate its psychological significance.
Method: We review relevant literature, especially with regards to interpersonal
representations, formulate a mathematical model and present a simulation study.
The model accommodates normative models from utility theory and places them within
the broader setting of Bayesian inference. Crucially, we endow people’s prior beliefs, into
which utilities are absorbed, with preferences of self and others. The simulation illustrates
the model’s dynamics and furnishes elementary predictions of the theory.
Results: (1) Because beliefs about self and others inform both the desirability and
plausibility of outcomes, in this framework interpersonal representations become beliefs
that have to be actively inferred. This inference, akin to “mentalizing” in the psychological
literature, is based upon the outcomes of interpersonal exchanges. (2) We show how
some well-known social-psychological phenomena (e.g., self-serving biases) can be
explained in terms of active interpersonal inference. (3) Mentalizing naturally entails
Bayesian updating of how people value social outcomes. Crucially this includes inference
about one’s own qualities and preferences.
Conclusion: We inaugurate a Bayes optimal framework for modeling intersubject
variability in mentalizing during interpersonal exchanges. Here, interpersonal
representations are endowed with explicit functional and affective properties. We
suggest the active inference framework lends itself to the study of psychiatric conditions
where mentalizing is distorted.
Keywords: free energy, active inference, value, evidence, surprise, self-organization, interpersonal, Bayesian
INTRODUCTION
There is growing interest in modeling behavioral and physio-
logical responses with biologically grounded normative models,
particularly in emerging disciplines such as neuroeconomics and
computational psychiatry. The motivation for these develop-
ments rests upon characterizing behavioral phenotypes in terms
of underlying variables that have a principled functional and—in
some instances—neurobiological interpretation. Recently, opti-
mal decision making has been formulated as a pure inference
problem to provide a relatively simple (active inference) frame-
work for modeling choice behavior and inference about hidden
states of the world generating outcomes (Friston et al., 2013).
This is a potentially important development because it provides
a coherent and parsimonious (Bayes) optimal model of behavior.
This normative model is consistent with classical treatments, such
as expected utility theory and softmax response rules, without
calling on ad hoc parameters like inverse temperature or temporal
discounting. This means that, in principle, one can characterize
people’s behavior in terms of prior beliefs about the world (as well
as the confidence or precision of those beliefs).
In this paper, we demonstrate that this approach can
also be applied fruitfully when choices—and the underlying
preferences—are based upon interpersonal beliefs about oneself
and other people. Social cognition merits special analysis as it
presents substantial challenges. An active inference framework
can usefully address some of these, but not without new theo-
retical considerations. In what follows, we describe the sorts of
beliefs that may underlie interpersonal exchange and use simula-
tions of active inference to demonstrate the behaviors that ensue.
In subsequent work, we hope to use these simulated choices to
explain observed behavior so as to characterize subjects in terms
of model parameters that encode interpersonal beliefs. The rou-
tines used for the simulations of this paper are available as part
of the academic SPM freeware and can be adapted to a variety of
games.
THEORIES OF AFFECTIVELY CHARGED BELIEFS ABOUT SELF AND
OTHERS
Self - and other- representations often are heavily affect-laden
and a vast literature is devoted to them. We cannot do justice
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to this entire field here and instead focus on four groups of the-
ories about interpersonal representations. Firstly, “homeostatic”
theories hold that an adequately positive self-representation is
so important in itself that healthy humans will even sacrifice
accurate explanations of social and psychological events to main-
tain positive self-representations. Classic psychological-defense
theories (Ogden, 1983; Rycroft, 1995) and attribution theo-
ries (Bentall, 2003) fall into this group. These theories easily
explain the biases that healthy people and psychiatric patients
exhibit in seeing the self in rosy colors (e.g., grandiosity) or
others in negative colors (e.g., racism) as self-representation-
boosting manoeuvres. Hence, these theories also explain how
the motives for one’s behavior can be ulterior to the motives
that the agent believes they are acting under. However, experi-
mental support for these theories is incomplete (Moutoussis et
al., 2013). Secondly, economic theories usually consider one’s
true preferences as known to the agent; while at the same time
their behavior may be directed at instrumentally managing their
reputation vis-a-vis others, including deceiving them (Camerer,
2003). Some social-psychological theories combine these utilitar-
ian perspectives into one construct, social desirability, said to have
both self-deceit and image-management components (Crowne
and Marlowe, 1960). Thirdly, there are a group of theories that
see many adult beliefs about the self and others as products of
learnt information-processing, relatively divorced from current
interests. Examples are the rigid “core beliefs” that people often
hold about themselves according to some cognitive-behavioral
theories (Waller et al., 2001) or the inaccurate beliefs formed
when strong affects are said to overwhelm peoples’ ability to
think about their own mind and that of others (Allen et al.,
2008). Finally, there are theories that take into account both
the fluidity and uncertainty of person-representations (like many
clinical and psychological theories) and an explicit, current func-
tional role for them (like the neuroeconomic tradition). This
is a smaller tradition, exemplified by the “sociometer theory of
self-esteem” (Leary et al., 1995). Here a particular aspect of self-
representation—self-esteem—predicts whether other people are
likely to include or exclude one from social interactions. As access
to human (e.g., friends, partners), material (e.g., work opportu-
nities), safety and other resources can be dramatically reduced
by social exclusion, self-esteem helps predict the success of social
interactions. When it comes to other-representation, the “sinister
attribution error” theory of apparently unwarranted suspicious-
ness (Kramer, 1994) formalizes a somewhat similar logic: that
taking others to be less well-meaning than they are serves to min-
imize false-negative errors in the detection of social difficulties.
However, the theories of Leary et al. and of Kramer are qualitative,
insufficiently general, and have not been applied to interactive
exchanges.
We seek to generalize the “sociometer theory” to encompass all
self- and other- representations that can be reasonably inferred
within interpersonal exchanges. In this paper, we provide a spe-
cific computational example of this. Psychologically it is easy to
appreciate how making inferences about others helps to make
predictions: For example, “a fair person will not exploit me.”
Similarly about the self, “honest people like me are trusted.”
However, interpersonal representations may come to serve as
preferred outcomes themselves; for example, “I’d prefer to be a
fair person and to deal with fair people.” They may summarize
(and even hide) social, cultural and ultimately evolutionary goals
that are not otherwise explicitly represented.
COMPUTATIONAL CHALLENGES OF DECISION-MAKING IN SOCIAL
EXCHANGES
One might expect people to maximize the overt benefits that they
extract from social interactions, such as food or mates, by log-
ically thinking through different policies and choosing the best.
However, such a project faces serious challenges, of which we con-
sider three. These motivate using interpersonal representations to
make predictions about exchanges and active inference to infer
both representations and policies.
The first challenge concerns the potentially explosive complex-
ity of social cognition. As a key example, interpersonal cognition
is recursive. In order to achieve maximum material benefit I
need to predict how another person will react. To do this I need
to imagine what they will decide. However, they should do the
same—estimate what I intend to do. Therefore I have to estimate
what they think that I intend to do. But they will do the same and
so on, without a well-defined end. In contrast, real people in real
situations only perform a very limited number of such recursive
steps. We argue that using interpersonal beliefs can increase the
effective depth of (otherwise costly) cognition.
The second concerns the arbitrariness of the parameterization
of many decision-making schemes. As a central example, just
one parameter is often used to describe the precision (inverse
noisiness) of choices given the values attached to these choices.
This precision parameter is then fitted to observed choice behav-
ior in an agnostic manner. The parameter in question has been
interpreted in a number of ways that are almost impossible to
distinguish: sometimes it is cast as intrinsic noise or error rate,
implying that agents are incapable of more precise or deter-
ministic choices. Sometimes, it is used to motivate a form of
exploration, implying that there is something unknown about the
situation and it is best not to put all one’s eggs in one basket. At
other times, it is seen as a sensitivity that reflects the change in
behavior for a change in returns. This last interpretation is closely
related to choice matching, whereby the preferred frequency of
different outcomes is an increasing function of their utility and
not a winner-takes-all preference. In learning paradigms it is also
difficult to separate estimates of precision from the learning rate
(Daw, 2011). Parameterization of an agents’ choices in terms of
a single noisiness parameter thus conflates error, exploration,
choice matching and, in practice, learning rates.
The active inference framework addresses this problem first by
taking account of the fact that there is always uncertainty about
outcomes. In a probabilistic sense, optimal outcomes are better
quantified in terms of probability distributions, as opposed to
scalar reward or utility functions. We can then separate the opti-
mal precision over action choice (en route to the outcome), which
describes how to best get to the desired distribution over outcomes,
from the preferred outcome distribution itself. The former preci-
sion can itself be optimized given beliefs about hidden states of
the world and controlled transitions among them—through for-
mulating choice behavior in terms of beliefs over policies. The
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precision in question is the precision of (or confidence in) beliefs
about alternative policies. It still weighs the choice between dif-
ferent policies, but it is no longer a free parameter! In contrast
the precision over outcome preferences is a reward sensitivity, in
principle testable independently of the task at hand. In the active
inference framework there is no need for a learning rate param-
eter as such—the optimal change of beliefs is inferred at each
step.
The third computational challenge rests on the difficult calcu-
lations entailed in using a model of the world to draw inferences.
Social inferences, for example, present a difficult inverse problem
when disambiguating the meaning of a particular social datum:
for example, “my partner gave me nothing” may be important
both for self-representation (“maybe because I am worthless”)
and for other-representation (“maybe because she is horrible”).
The framework that we describe is well suited to deal with such
ambiguities. Their resolution rests upon prior beliefs about social
outcomes that can be updated on the basis of experience in
a Bayes optimal fashion. This, like all statistical inversion of
probabilistic models, is computationally challenging; the active
inference framework suggests a practical solution based on so-
called Variational Bayes (a ubiquitous instance of approximate
Bayesian inference that finesses computational complexity). In
this paper, we will use approximate Bayesian inference to show
how interpersonal representations are accommodated in terms of
prior beliefs; thereby providing a normative framework within
which to parameterize different people and their interpersonal
beliefs.
This paper comprises three sections. The first provides a brief
introduction to active inference, with a special emphasis on how
preferences and goals can be cast in terms of prior beliefs about
eventual outcomes. This enables goal-directed behavior to be
described purely in terms of inference about states of the world
and subsequent behavior. The second section introduces a Trust
game to illustrate the formal aspects of modeling interpersonal
exchanges within this framework. The third (Results) section
uses simulations of this game under active inference to highlight
how interpersonal beliefs produce characteristic choice behaviors.
We conclude with a discussion of putative applications of this
approach to normative behavioral modeling.
METHODS
This section summarizes the building blocks of Active infer-
ence, which include the following: Adaptive agents are held
to (i) set themselves desirable goals that they consider likely
to achieve (ii) choose policies that maximize the likelihood of
achieving these goals (iii) form beliefs about the world con-
sistent both with their sensory observations and their goals.
In this section, we also briefly describe a practical way of
solving this inference problem, i.e., (iv) using an inference
process that involves the passing of simple messages between
cognitive modules. This Variational Bayes (VB) message pass-
ing or updating is a simpler and more biologically plausible
method for performing approximate Bayesian inference than
the schemes usually considered. We then formulate a model of
a simple interpersonal exchange and describe its implementa-
tion so that others researchers can use it. The definition and
meaning of the mathematical symbols we use is summarized in
Table 1.
SUMMARY OF ACTIVE INFERENCE
Setting plausible goals
In active inference, action elicits outcomes that are the most plau-
sible under beliefs about how they are caused. This approach
contrasts with normative formulations in optimal decision the-
ory, where actions are chosen to maximize the value of outcomes
rather than plausibility. However, beliefs about outcomes are
not motivationally neutral—an agent believes that her actions
will lead to good outcomes. Therefore, if the prior beliefs about
outcomes—the agent’s goals or hopes—reflect the utility of those
outcomes, then active inference can implement optimal policies,
effectively seeking out the outcomes with the greatest utility.
In general, agents may have subtle reasons to distribute their
prior beliefs over particular outcomes. They may, for example,
use a matching law such as Herrnstein or softmax mapping to
preserve ecological resources or to distribute goods among con-
specifics. We model an agent’s preference with a softmax function
σ(r(sT), β) of objective returns r at the outcome time T, so that
prior (utilitarian) beliefs for any agent or model m, are written as
follows:
P(sT |m) = σ(r(sT), β) (1)
This describes a probability distribution over states sT at time T.
Probability depends upon the return associated with each state.
This classical utility function is expressed as a map from objec-
tive ultimate outcomes to prior beliefs, with the relative utility of
different outcomes depending upon a sensitivity parameter β.
Choosing policies to achieve the plausible goals
Suppose that an agent believes that at time t they occupy a state
st . They then need to choose a policy comprising a sequence of
control states u˜ = {ut · · · uT} that leads to the desired outcome
distribution P(sT |m). If u˜ leads to a distribution over final or
outcome states P(sT |st, u˜), then success can be measured by the
Kullback-Leibler divergence between the anticipated and desired
distribution. The agent can then choose policies according to this
measure of their likely success. Following Friston et al. (2013), we
can express this formally as follows:
P(u˜|st, γ,m) = 1Z exp(−γDKL[P(sT |st, u˜)||P(sT |m)]) (2)
Here, we have introduced a normalizing constant Z and a confi-
dence or precision parameter γ. While the softmax parameter β in
Equation 1. calibrates the relative utility of different outcomes, the
precision parameter γ encodes the confidence that desired goals
can be reached, based on current beliefs about the world and the
policies available. Unless otherwise stated we will use the unqual-
ified term “precision” for γ. Crucially, precision has to be inferred
so that the confidence is optimal, in relation to the current state
(context) and beliefs about the current state and future states.
Forming beliefs consistent with observations and goals
In our model, agents need to perform inference about certain
quantities. An agent’s knowledge of how they interact with the
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org March 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 160 | 3
Moutoussis et al. A formal model of interpersonal inference
Table 1 | Additional definitions and significance of symbols that appear in equations.
Symbol Definition and significance Formula where symbol first appears
P Probability mass of a discrete random variable, or probability density
of a continuous random variable
P (sT |m) = σ(r (sT ), β)
sT Outcome state—a state that the agent may arrive at time T, the end
of the exchange
m Model of the world according to the agent. It includes all the rules of
how the dynamics of the world evolve, as well as the parameters of
the world that don’t change as the world evolves
β Inverse temperature over outcomes. It signifies how strongly prior
(utilitarian) beliefs change as a function of the outcome measure in
question (e.g., money) at the point of indifference.
σ(
−→x , β) The Gibbs softmax function. It ascribes to each component of xi ∈ x
a probability proportional to exp(βxi )
r(x) Return associated with state x.
ut , u˜ ut is a control state—that is, a state that the agent believes s/he will
deploy at time t. In general this does not necessarily determine
what action will be realized at time t—the agent may not have full
control over this. However in our agents do have such control, so ut
equates with the decision about the action to take. u˜ is the
sequence of control states believed to be taken from now to the
outcome (e.g.,: “I will type in all the letters of my password”).
u˜ = {ut ... uT }
γ Precision of belief about control sequences. It signifies the
confidence that the goal will be attained, if the best attainable
combinations of control states are employed.
P(u˜|st , γ,m) =
= 1Z exp(−γDKL[P(sT |st , u˜)||P(sT |m)])
Z Normalizing constant. In many cases we consider how strong
beliefs are relative to each other; Dividing each by their sum Z
ensures they add up to one, as probabilities should.
DKL[P0(x)||P1(x)] Kullback-Leibler divergence between a distribution P0(x) and
another distribution P1(x). It is the expectation with respect to
P0(x) of the difference in surprise inherent in encountering each
possible value of x according to the two distributions.
Pr Probability value; Pr(x = a) is the probability that x takes the value a. P(o˜, s˜, u˜, γ|m) = Pr({o 0, . . . , ot } = o˜,
{s0, . . . , st } = s˜, {ut , . . . , uT } = u˜, γ)
P(o˜, s˜, u˜, γ|m) Probability density according to the generative model m; i.e., the
world including the agent
P(o˜, s˜, u˜, γ|m) =
= P(o˜|s˜,m)P(u˜|st , γ,m)P(s˜|m)P(γ|m)
Q(s˜, u˜, γ|μ) Q is the belief that agent infers using the approximate inference
scheme. Rather than being expressed in terms of probability
distributions, it is expressed in terms of their “sufficient statistics”
μ, such as its expectation. Not to be confused with Q, the matrix
representation of policy values.
Q(s˜, u˜, γ|μ) ≈ Pr({s0, . . . , st } = s˜, {ut , . . . , uT } = u˜, γ)
μ = (s0, ..., s t , u,

γ) The specific instantiation of the sufficient statistics in our example. μ = (s0, ..., s t , u,

γ)
H[P(x)] H is the Entropy of the distribution P(x). It is a measure of the
average surprise of this distribution
−DKL[P(sT |st , u˜)||P(sT |m)] =
= H[P(sT |st , u˜)] + EP(sT |st ,u˜)[lnP(sT |m)]
EP(x)[lnP(x)] EP(x)[f (x)] signifies the Expectation of f (x) under the probability
distribution P(x). In active inference lnP(x) is a measure of utility.
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world can be expressed as a joint distribution over these requisite
quantities:
P(o˜, s˜, u˜, γ|m) = Pr({o0, . . . , ot} = o˜,
{s0, . . . , st} = s˜, {ut, . . . , uT} = u˜, γ) (3)
This probabilistic knowledge constitutes a generative model over
observations, states, control and precision. This model is consti-
tuted by prior beliefs about policies P(u˜|st, γ,m)—as specified
by Equation 2—state transitions, the likelihood of a sequence of
observations stemming from those states and prior beliefs about
precision:
P(o˜, s˜, u˜, γ|m) = P(o˜|s˜,m)P(s˜|u˜,m)P(u˜|st, γ,m)P(γ|m) (4)
Agents can use this model to infer the hidden states of the world
s˜ = {s0 · · · st}; to determine where each policy, or sequence of
choices, u˜ = {ut · · · uT}, is likely to lead; and to select the pre-
cision γ that encodes the confidence in policy selection. Agents
can infer hidden states, their policy and precision from observed
outcomes by inverting the model above. To do this they have
two assets at their disposal: their observations o˜ = {o1 · · · ot} and
their modelm of choice-dependent probabilistic state transitions.
To keep things simple, we assume a one-to-one mapping
between observations and states of the world. This is encoded
by an identity matrix A with columns corresponding to states,
rows corresponding to observations and elements encoding the
likelihood of observations—P(o˜|s˜,m), under their model.
State transitions in an interpersonal world
We can describe the possible states of the world as a cross prod-
uct between a subspace which is hidden and one which can be
observed. An example of the former is “my partner is cooperative”
whereas an example from the latter is “they will give me noth-
ing.” We model transitions between hidden states as constrained
by the meaning of these subspaces. The part of the world-state
that describes my partner’s traits cannot change (otherwise they
would not be traits). The part which describes their actions will
be a probabilistic function of what I will do. As an example, the
action “they will give me nothing” is probable if I follow a policy
of giving them nothing myself.
Agents therefore describe changes in the world contingent
upon what they do in terms of a 3-D transition matrix. This
matrix B(ut) has one “page” for each control state ut that the
agent can employ. Each page has columns of possible states at time
t; and rows of the possible states at time t+1. The entries of B are
the probabilities P(st+1|st, u˜). As the reader may have noticed, the
policy-dependent probabilities in Equation 2 can be derived by
the repeated application of B.
A practical method for performing inference
If agents have at their disposal a function F that approximates how
inconsistent their beliefs and observations were, they can mini-
mize F to maximize the chance of achieving their goals. A suitable
function F is the free energy of observations and beliefs under a
model of the world. The reader is referred to Friston et al. (2013)
for a full explication of free energy in active inference. For our
purposes, we just need to know that F provides a measure of the
probability of the observations under the model F ≈ − ln P(o˜|m).
This means that minimizing free energy renders observations the
least surprising, under my model: “Given that I am likely to be
at work in an hour (belief under model of the world) it is not
surprising that I’m in a train station (observation); it would be
surprising if I headed for the cinema (belief about behavior).” The
free energy defined by a generative model is thus an objective
function with respect to optimal behavior—where optimality is
defined by the agent’s beliefs.
Posterior beliefs correspond to an approximate posterior prob-
ability over states, policies and precision. These beliefs are param-
eterized by sufficient statisticsμ ∈ Rd such that Q(s˜, u˜, γ|μ) ≈
Pr({s0, . . . , st} = s˜, {ut, . . . , uT} = u˜, γ). The free energy then
becomes a function of the sufficient statistics of the approxi-
mate posterior distribution. This allows us to express approximate
Bayesian inference in terms of free energy minimization:
μt = argminμF(o˜,μ) (5)
where actions or choices are sampled from Pr (at = ut) =
Q(ut |μt). This means policies are selected that lead to the least
surprising actions and outcomes. In summary, the optimization
of sufficient statistics (usually expectations) rests upon a gener-
ative model and therefore depends on prior beliefs. It is these
beliefs that specify what is surprising and consequently optimal
behavior in both a Bayesian and utilitarian (optimal decision
theory) sense.
A common scheme used to perform free-energy minimization
is VB. Many statistical procedures used in everyday data analysis
can be derived as special cases of VB. We will not go into technical
details and interested readers can find a treatment of VB relevant
to the present discussion in Friston et al. (2013). Here, we note
that VB allows us to partition the sufficient statistics into three
common-sense subsets: statistics describing beliefs about states
of the world causing observations; statistics describing beliefs
about the (future) policy u˜ = {ut ... uT} to be selected; and statis-
tics describing beliefs about precision γ: μ = (s 0, ..., s t, u,

γ).
These statistics are updated with each new observation, using
variational message passing (VMP). Each belief (about precision,
about the state of the world etc.) is a probability distribution
held in a “node” of a network of such beliefs, as in Figure 1.
Each belief not only has a most-likely-value but also an uncer-
tainty, and possibly other features, that describe the exact shape
of the distribution. In our case, these features are encoded by the
statistics above. In VMP, the belief distributions and their associ-
ated parameters (sufficient statistics) are chosen from amongst a
rich and flexible—but not unlimited—vocabulary, the so-called
conjugate-exponential belief networks. When one of the beliefs—
say, the sensory state—is updated via an observation, it is no
longer consistent with the others: the free energy increases. The
“node” of the network representing this belief then sends infor-
mation about its new content (e.g., the expectation or mean of
the distribution) to all the other belief “nodes” with which it is
connected. It also sends information about the beliefs on which it
depends to nodes sending messages, which mandates a reciprocal
or recurrent message passing. The recipient “nodes” then adjust
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FIGURE 1 | This figure illustrates the cognitive and functional anatomy
implied by the mean field assumption used in Variational Bayes. Here, we
have associated the variational updates of expected states with perception, of
future control states (policies) within action selection and, finally, expected
precision with evaluation. The updates suggest the sufficient statistics from
each subset are passed among each other until convergence to an internally
consistent (Bayes optimal) solution. In terms of neuronal implementation, this
might be likened to the exchange of neuronal signals via extrinsic connections
among functionally specialized brain systems. In this (purely iconic) schematic,
we have associated perception (inference about the current state of the world)
with the prefrontal cortex, while assigning action selection to the basal ganglia.
Crucially, precision has been associated with dopaminergic projections from
ventral tegmental area and substantia nigra. See Friston et al. (2013), whence
this figure has been adapted, for a full description of the equations.
their parameters, and thus change the beliefs they encode, so as
to increase consistency with the source of the message. Of course,
this may put them a little out of line with yet other beliefs. Hence
messages propagate back and forth via all the connections in the
network, changing the statistical parameters that the nodes hold,
until free energy cannot be reduced any further and consistency
is once again optimized (Winn and Bishop, 2005).
The simplicity and generality of this VMP scheme speaks to the
biological plausibility of its neuronal implementation (Friston et
al., 2013). A common objection to Bayesian schemes is that it is
implausible that the brain performs long algebraic derivations, or
alternatively high-dimensional numerical integration, every time
a new task was at hand. However, evolution may have converged
on the simplicity and efficiency of VMP—or at least something
like it.
Figure 1 shows the architecture of variational updates for any
generative model of choice outcomes and hidden states that can
be formulated as a Markov decision process. The functional
anatomy implied by the update equations is shown (schemati-
cally) on the right. Here the distributions over observations given
hidden states are categorical and parameterized by thematrixA as
above. Similarly, the transition matrices B(ut) encode transition
probabilities from one state to the next, under the current control
state of a policy (u˜ = {ut · · · uT}).
In the simulations that follow we used a prior over precision
that has a gamma distribution with shape and scale parame-
ters α = 8 and θ = 1. The matrix Q contains the values of the
i-th policy from the j-th current state and corresponds to the
divergence term in Equation 2. We see that expectations about
hidden states of the world are updated on the basis of sensory
evidence, beliefs about state transitions and value expected under
allowable policies. Conversely, policies are selected on the basis of
the expected value over hidden states, while precision is mono-
tonically related to value expected over hidden states and policies.
See Friston et al. (2013) for details.
INFERENCES ABOUT PEOPLE IN A MODEL TASK
The simplified trust game
To illustrate the basic features of this formulation we construct
a model1 of a simplified Trust Task based on the multi-round
Investor-Trustee game (King-Casas et al., 2008). I (self ) am to
play consecutive rounds with the Trustee (other). At each round
t I earn a wage wself , usually set at 20 units of play money. I can
then invest one of a discrete set of fractions f self , low, . . . , f self , high
of my wage in a joint venture with the other. The investment is
multiplied by a gain g, representing the surplus value created by
the joint venture (usually g = 3). The other then returns a frac-
tion of the invested amount. The round ends with the following
returns:
r
self
t = w self − w self f self + w self f self f other
rothert = w self f self g − w self f self f other
(6)
1Here we present the model step-by-step; see also the Discussion section
regarding the rationale behind specific modeling choices.
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Our Trust-Task is simpler than the standard Investor-Trustee
game, with respect to the levels of investment and repay-
ment available to the players. We make available only two
levels, thus rendering a matrix representation of the exchange
more straightforward and allowing experimenters to enforce
(psychologically) interesting choices. The available response
fractions f correspond only to Cooperation (action 1) or
Defection (action 2). A matrix of monetary returns for self and
other that can be used for this simplified task is shown in
Table 2.
The task is a multi-round game—partners have to make
decisions, taking into account long-term consequences of their
choices. This is a difficult problem—and we will see that appro-
priate use of interpersonal representations may be used as a
shortcut.
Interpersonal representations and prosocial utilities
We now consider the issue of how preferences are constituted
in the generative model. To construct our minimal model, we
assume the following:
1. self and other are each represented by a single scalar quantity—
“how good one is.” We will call this “esteem” so that es is how
good the self is, while the esteem of the other is eo.
2. A “good” person, with positive esteem, is more likely to
cooperate with an average person, all other things being equal.
3. An average person is more likely to cooperate with a “good”
person, other things being equal.
The observable component of world states is disclosed by action
(uo, us) and the hidden component (es, eo) concerns the traits
to be inferred. The fact that a “good” person is more likely to
cooperate—and to attract cooperation—highlights the fact that
esteem can augment the utility of cooperation. An analogous
reasoning applies to defection.
Preferential biases induced by esteem can be specified in terms
of an augmented return that includes the payoff and esteem.
Following the format of Table 2 we write:
Table 2 | Trust Task monetary returns matrix with only two choices for
each partner.
Other
self uo = 1 uo = 2
(Cooperate: f other, high) (Defect: f other, low )
us = 1 rs11 (e.g., =26) rs21 (e.g., =10)
(Cooperate: f self , high) ro11 (e.g., =26) r
o
21 (e.g., =42)
us = 2 rs12 (e.g., =21) rs22 (e.g., =18)
(Defect: f self , low ) ro12 (e.g., =7) r
o
22 (e.g., =10)
These returns are defined by payoffs rs11 > r
s
12 ≥ rs22 > rs21 for the self (in the
Investor role) and ro21 > r
o
11 ≥ ro22 > ro12 for the other (in the Trustee role). The task
is constructed as a sequential game, with my self playing first, and is typically
asymmetric. In the example in brackets I have a “wage” of 20 units. I can choose
to invest f self , low = 20% or f self ,high = 80%; the other can choose to return 40
or 140% of my investment. All amounts have been rounded.
rs(uo = 1, us = 1, es, eo) = βsrrs22 + es + eo
ro(uo = 1, us = 1, es, eo) = βor rs22 + es + eo
(7)
Table 3 gives the augmented returns for each combination of
outcomes.
With this setup observable outcomes can take just 5 values: A
“starting state” and four outcomes: o2 = {us = 1, uo = 1}, o3 =
{us = 2, uo = 1} and so on, for all combinations of cooperation
and defection. For each round, each player has to model the
transition probabilities P(sT |st, u˜). If ro(uot , ust, es, eo) denotes the
augmented return for the other, self can use a softmax function to
calculate the probabilities of actions taken by the other (following
Equation 1):
P(uot |ust, es, eo) =
exp(ro)
∑
c exp(r
o)
(8)
However, this requires that self knows the beliefs of other about
hidden esteems (es, eo). We will assume that self uses beliefs about
their esteem to model the beliefs of the other. We will see later
that this is not an unreasonable assumption. Furthermore, we
assumed that players can resolve just two levels of esteem eo = p
(for prosocial) or eo = n (for non-social or antisocial). To fur-
ther simplify things, we assume that the self esteem is neutral,
eo = 0. Prior beliefs about choices will then be influenced by “who
I would like you to be” and “what I would like (us) to get.” These
simplifications create a discrete hidden state space with 10 states.
These correspond to the five observable states, for each of the
two levels of the other’s esteem eo ∈ {p, n}. The action chosen by
self were sampled from posterior beliefs over choices based on
the prior beliefs over policies of Equation 2. These prior beliefs
depended on the utilities in Table 3.
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TRUST GAME IN ITERATED PLAY
We implemented the multi-round version of the Trust game by
using the posterior beliefs about the partner, at the end of each
round, as the priors for the next round.
The software routines were written using the SPM aca-
demic freeware platform in matlab (MATLAB, 2012). The SPM
platform, including the DEM toolbox used here, is available
Table 3 | Utility matrix for the simplified Trust task.
Other
self uo = 1 (Cooperate) uo = 2 (Defect)
us = 1 βr rs11 + es + eo βr rs21 + es + eo
(Cooperate) βr ro11 + es + eo βr ro21 − es − eo
us = 2 βr rs12 − es − eo βr rs22 − es − eo
(Defect) βr ro12 + es + eo βr ro22 − es − eo
The entries of Table 1 are weighted by a sensitivity parameter and then
augmented by an interpersonal component to form socialized returns. The inter-
personal component consists of the esteem for each partner plus the esteem for
the other partner (weighted equally in this example). Positive esteems enhance
cooperative utility whereas negative esteem increases the utility of defecting.
We have assumed here that βsr = βor = βr .
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under GPL (GNU General Public License, version 3, 2007). It
can be accessed via www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/software/spm12.
Additional scripts are available from the corresponding author on
demand, also under GPL.
RESULTS
In order to perform simulations we used the monetary values
in Table 1. To calculate the numerical values corresponding to
Table 2, we chose a value for βr such that the resulting prob-
abilities according to Equation 8 would be very distributed.
Furthermore, for the purposes of this demonstration, we chose
the other to be antisocial; i.e., have a negative esteem, and naïve;
i.e., only influenced by immediate outcomes (as per Equation 8).
The preferences (priors) that these choices translate into for the
other are shown in Figure 2A. The other would prefer the self to
cooperate and the other herself to defect (cd in Figure 2A). Their
second best preference would be mutual cooperation (cc), which
still has a substantial monetary outcome. The other is indifferent
about the remaining two options, in which the self defects (dc,
dd). In Figure 2, we have included the starting state (start) as a
potential outcome—as is required by the model specification in
the code we used. We set the starting state probability to zero, as it
never actually materializes as an outcome and agents do not need
to consider a preference for it.
The situation is a little more complicated, and more interest-
ing, with respect to the goals of the self that this scheme gives rise
to. These are shown in Figure 2B. Whereas our antisocial, naïve
FIGURE 2 | Pattern of social utilities lnP(sT |m) = σ(rs(sT ), β). (A)
Preferences of the other. This simple other only considers observable
states of each round—the starting state (start), and each of the four
self -action—other -action combinations shown in Table 3. The “start” state
is only indicated for completeness: agents correctly never consider it as an
outcome. (B) Preferences (goals) of the self. Preferences over all 10 hidden
states are shown; See text for detailed description.
other did not consider separate states for prosocial vs. antisocial
self, we endowed the self with preferences depending on the type
of the other and hence we consider the full 10-state outcome space
for each round of the exchange.
Figure 2B shows that the preference of the self for mutual
cooperation is more pronounced if the other is prosocial. As one
might expect, given an antisocial other the second-best preference
for self is for the other to cooperate while self defects. More inter-
estingly, given a prosocial other the second-best preference for the
self is to cooperate, while the prosocial other defects. Heuristically,
self is forgiving toward prosocial but not antisocial others.
A SINGLE-ROUND
The basic behavior of self when choosing a policy through free
energy minimization is shown in Figure 3. Initially, self believes
that the other is equally likely to be p or n. In other words, at the
beginning of a series of exchanges, we assume people are agnos-
tic as to the character or esteem of their opponent. Notice that
although there are 10 hidden states, there are only five observable
states—because the esteem (of the other) is hidden and has to be
inferred.
At the first time step self just observes the starting state and
believes the other is equally likely to be prosocial or antisocial,
corresponding to hidden states 1 or 6. Still, under the influence
of their utilitarian priors self assigns a higher probability to the
cooperative policy (control state 1). With the parameters used
in this example, this is a modest preference: as it happens, the
FIGURE 3 | Inferences made by self during a single round, where self
initially believes that the other is just as likely to be prosocial as
antisocial. The numbering of states from 1 to 10 corresponds to the 10
states in Figure 2B. (A) This shows that the observable state changed from
state 1, the starting state, to 5, corresponding to mutual defection during
this example round. (B) Initially the belief of self was equally shared
between playing a prosocial partner or an antisocial partner (state 1 or 6). At
the end of the round, belief was shared between mutual defection with a
prosocial (s5) or antisocial (s10) partner, but no longer equally so. Defection
made the self infer that the other was more likely to be antisocial: P(s10) >
P(s5). The column “Full priors” corresponds to Figure 2B. (C) Control state
1 (cooperation) is slightly favored despite agnosticism, at this stage, as to
the type of the other. As it happened however the self still chose to defect,
as choice is probabilistic (D). The underlying true states: in this example the
other is antisocial.
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choice selected was to defect—to which the other responded by
also defecting. Self therefore observes outcome state 5. Finally, on
the basis of this outcome, self infers that they are more likely to
be playing an antisocial other, which is the case. Clearly, in a single
round, self cannot make use of this inference. However, if we now
replace the prior beliefs about the other with the posterior beliefs
and play a further round, we can emulate Bayesian updating of
beliefs about the other. We now turn to the simulation of iterated
play using this method of updating beliefs.
ITERATED PLAY
During iterated play, beliefs about the other evolve. This has a
knock-on effect on the goals or priors for each round—that pro-
duce a progressive change in preferred policies as one learns about
the other and adjusts one’s behavior accordingly. The result of
a multi-round game is shown in Figure 4 and reveals several
interesting features:
The agent infers fairly quickly that the other is antisocial and
reduces cooperative play. In this example, they still engage a
considerable amount of cooperative play – outcome state 4 in
Figure 4C is self-cooperate, other-defect o4 = {us = 1, uo = 2}.
These outcomes reflect the preference of self, not a lack of confi-
dence or expected precision. The evolution of expected precision
is interesting. Precision reflects whether the available policies can
FIGURE 4 | (A) A sequence of 32 rounds of the simplified Trust task. Over
the course of approximately 10 rounds, self becomes confident that other
is antisocial. (B) This increasing belief results in a declining belief in
(preference for) cooperating. (C) In this example the actions chosen are
quite variable and: (D) expected precision changes relatively slowly. The
variability of responses is due to the relatively weak preferences over
different outcomes used here; this is to illustrate how one quantity (e.g.,
expected precision) changes with respect to another (e.g., players’ choices)
over a single round or over a sequence of rounds.
fulfill the goals or utilitarian priors. Initially, there was prior belief
that fully cooperative play might be achieved, given the other
might be prosocial. When it looked as if this was the case (out-
come state 2 in Figure 4C), precision jumped optimistically (4D).
However, overall, there is a slower increase in expected precision,
as the agent realizes the true nature of the opponent (i.e., that the
other is antisocial). This illustrative example highlights the impor-
tant interplay between prior beliefs about outcomes, inference
on hidden states or characteristics of opponents and, crucially,
confidence in the ensuing beliefs.
DISCUSSION
In this paper, we applied active inference to interpersonal decision
making. Using a simple example, we captured key aspects of single
and repeated exchanges. This example belongs to the large fam-
ily of partially observable Markov decision problems (POMDP)
but its solution is distinguished by explicit consideration of the
agent’s goals as prior distributions over outcomes. Because behav-
ior depends upon beliefs, this necessarily entails beliefs that have
precision. In other words, it is not sufficient simply to consider
the goals of interpersonal exchange, one also has two consider the
confidence that those goals can be attained. We have focused on
optimizing this precision of beliefs about different policies—as
opposed to sensitivity to different outcomes. In what follows, we
consider the difference between sensitivity and precision.We then
consider the nature of interpersonal inference and how it shapes
decision-making. Finally, we discuss further developments along
these lines.
SENSITIVITY OVER OUTCOMES vs. PRECISION OVER POLICY CHOICE
One of the key consequences of our formulation is the sep-
aration of choice behavior into two components. The first is
inherent in the prior distribution itself, which reflects goals that
are not directly represented in the exchange—as might be codi-
fied by various matching rules or exploratory drives. The second
is optimized by the agent during the exchange itself in order
to maximize utility or returns, in light of what is realistic. As
described in Friston et al. (2013), this decomposition can be
seen clearly by expressing the negative divergence—that consti-
tutes prior beliefs—in terms of entropy (promoting exploration
of allowable states) and expected utility:
− DKL[P(sT |st, u˜)||P(sT |m)] = H[P(sT |st, u˜)]
+ EP(sT |st ,u˜)[ln P(sT |m)] (9)
Therefore minimizing the difference between attainable and
desired outcomes can always be expressed in terms of maximiz-
ing expected utility, under the constraint that the entropy or
dispersion of the final outcomes is as high as possible.
This separation of choice behavior—into (context-sensitive)
beliefs about policies vs. (context invariant) beliefs about which
outcomes are desirable—is reflected by an introduction of preci-
sion γ to complement the softmax sensitivity β. Both parameters
play the role of precision or sensitivity (inverse temperature). β
determines how sensitive prior beliefs are to rewards or the rela-
tive utility of different outcomes. However, this does not specify
the confidence or precision that these outcomes can be attained.
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This is where the precision parameter γ comes in—it encodes the
confidence that desired outcomes can be reached, based on cur-
rent beliefs about the world and allowable policies. For example,
one can be very uncertain about the contingencies that intervene
between the current state and final outcome, even if one is con-
fident that a particular outcome has much greater utility than
another.
Crucially, the precision of the probability distribution over
alternative policies can itself be inferred in a Bayes-optimal sense.
This represents a departure from classical formulations. It arises
because we are formulating policy selection in terms of infer-
ence. Choices are based upon beliefs (or inference) and beliefs in
turn are held with greater or lesser confidence. The Bayes-optimal
selection of precision over policies is a key thing that the cur-
rent formulation brings to the table, above and beyond classical
formulations.
INTERPERSONAL REPRESENTATIONS AS MOTIVATING BELIEFS
Ourmodeling demonstrates that the formulation of interpersonal
representations in terms of plausible and desirable outcomes
accommodates a number of psychological findings and points to
interesting theoretical and empirical questions.
First, our model replicates basic features of other successful
models of interactive games. The ‘esteem’ traits in our model
parallel the role of fairness-related coefficients in other mod-
els (Xiang et al., 2012). Second, our model infers the type of
the partner (e.g., Figure 4A) and adjusts its policy so that it is
not exploited (Figure 4B). Thirdly, posterior beliefs are based
upon a generative model that entails beliefs about beliefs (utility
functions) of others. This endows the generative model with an
elemental theory of mind. Furthermore, Bayesian inference about
esteem, and therefore intentions, constitute an elementary form
ofmentalizing (Allen et al., 2008).
In our case the fact that interpersonal representations con-
tribute to the agent’s beliefs about the desirability of out-
comes biases inference about states perceived and actions selected.
The perceptual update in Figure 1 contains a contribution
from precision. This is a remarkable effect of approximate
Bayesian inference. In our example (Figure 4B) the result is
that the agent is biased toward co-operativity, despite believ-
ing that the other is as likely to be uncooperative as not
(Figure 4A). This is an interpersonal analog of optimism bias,
or ‘giving the benefit of the doubt’. There is experimental evi-
dence in the Trust task that beliefs about prosocial traits in
the other result in preference structures akin to the proso-
cial side of Figure 2A. When Investors are made to believe
that the Trustee is of ‘moral character’ they entrust larger
amounts (in our terms, cooperate in a sustained manner) even
if the experimenter manipulates Trustee behavior so that the
Investor does not make more money as a result (Delgado et al.,
2005).
Our treatment suggests that interpersonal representations can
help predict (and seek out) the outcomes of interactions. The idea
that a self-esteem aspect of self-representation helps predict social
outcomes is a central empirical finding of research by Leary and
co-workers (Leary et al., 1995). Aspects of other-representation
that help predict active social outcomes can be found in negative
ideas about others, that healthy people harbor in certain contexts.
As mentioned, exaggerated suspicion about others can serve to
manage false-negative errors in the detection of social difficul-
ties (Kramer, 1994). Computationally, more sophisticated agents
can predict interactions better. Under certain constraints, how-
ever, interpersonal beliefs in the form of prosocial biases help
achieve behavior that emulates such sophisticated thinking, a key
theoretical finding of Yoshida and co-workers (Yoshida et al.,
2008).
Interpersonal inference suggests that the use of self-
representations to predict outcomes requires an assessment of
context. In our Trust task, my partner and I can just consider
one round in the future, provided we have inferred our types
appropriately and, implicitly, the effective nature of the exchange
(cooperative or competitive, etc.). Our simulation contains an
interesting example of what happens if the wrong representations
are assumed. The game is cooperative but, in our example, the
other is antisocial (and unsophisticated). The other’s preference,
stemming from their negative “niceness” (esteem), is to defect
while the self cooperates, followed by mutual cooperation. Note
that this preference structure is the only element in our naïve
other’s cognitive machinery. When the self infers this preference
structure they switch to a more uncooperative policy, thus under-
mining the other’s goals. Had the other been “nice” enough, or
had they believed the self to be “nice” enough, the self would
have inferred this and the other’s predictions, or goals, would be
fulfilled.
We see that goals are not prescribed by immediate reward but
by more generic beliefs. Clearly, there are an enormous number
of forms for these beliefs that we could consider that help pre-
dict and realize different outcomes in different contexts. In the
present context, one might consider the long-term payoffs that
accrue from a collaborative policy for the agent or for everybody.
Crucially, collaboration entails a consilience in terms of proso-
cial preferences or utility. The key thing about prosocial utility is
that it can be symmetrical with respect to me and my opponent.
For example, I may altruistically value the total reward accrued by
myself andmy opponent if I think they are prosocial, but only my
own rewards if they are antisocial. In our simple illustration, and
with the right choice of parameters, this would result in a very
similar pattern of exchange to that seen in Figure 3. Alternatively,
through some aversion to inequality, self might prefer equitable
outcomes (irrespective of who gets most).
In our simulations the effect of esteem operates like a social
Pavlovian bias, biasing beliefs irrespective of their consequences.
A Pavlovian bias enhances certain actions in certain contexts. For
example, it enhances passivity in a context of threat or vigorous
approach in a context of opportunity, irrespective of instrumental
outcomes. Our social Pavlovian bias promotes certain actions in
the context of certain personal esteems irrespective of instrumen-
tal outcomes. Here, we chose a scheme of social Pavlovian biases
that makes direct links between contemporary research into these
fundamental biases (Guitart-Masip et al., 2012) and the large
body of clinical- and social- psychological work on affectively
charged representations of people. This work spans Aristotelian
ethics, forensic psychotherapy (Gilligan, 2000) through to attri-
bution theory (Thewissen et al., 2011).
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We placed emphasis on prior beliefs as they may absorb var-
ious beliefs about long-term outcomes. These utilitarian beliefs
entail the agents’ cognitive-affective horizon, beyond which the
agent has no knowledge and no control. This contrasts with the
dynamics of the exchange, wherein the agent has both beliefs
about states and beliefs about control. We envisage that the
present approach will help disentangle these two components in
the setting of interpersonal dynamics.
Although our ultimate aim is to study how self-representation
is inferred under active inference, in this introductory study
we have kept self-representation constant. Although we hope
to examine this in future work here we note that a Bayesian
framework naturally predicts that ordinary self-representation
should be less responsive to evidence than the representation
of others. Setting aside beliefs about changeability of the self,
as well as the real possibility that aspects of self-representation
may be learnt “once and for all” during childhood, inference
about self-representations must take place on the basis of a much
greater evidence base than inference about strangers. Therefore
each new piece of evidence is expected to have less impact on
self-representation than other-representation.
MODELING CHOICES, LIMITATIONS AND OUTLOOK
What does my partner think of me?
It may appear that we made a gross simplification in modeling
the self using their own representation to estimate how the other
sees the self. A more general formulation might be more con-
ventional, where the beliefs of the self (self-representation and
reputation with respect to others) are separate. Yet this is not a
modeling choice made to make the model simpler. For example,
clinical psychology indicates that beliefs about the self are highly
correlated with beliefs about how others see the self. Moreover,
patients with unwarranted beliefs about themselves and others
that look “psychologically defensive” show no greater social desir-
ability than healthy controls (Moutoussis et al., 2013). We suggest
that the self uses beliefs about their esteem to model the beliefs of
the other, a generalization of the “sociometer” theory with a view
to testing the limits of this assumption’s predictive power.
Depth-of-thought
Our model uses a very simple other, who makes no inferences
about itself. Clearly, this is not a realistic simulation of other.
Furthermore, our model self does did not explicitly calculate dis-
tant outcomes before applying the prior “horizon.” The latter is
partly justified as most people look to the future to quite a lim-
ited extent. In the Trust Task, only about a quarter of Investors
show up to two levels of recursive interpersonal thought (Xiang et
al., 2012). Having said this, further work needs to consider agents
that explicitly simulate outcomes for a small number of steps into
the future and apply inference and preferences to patterns of such
outcomes.
Normative self-representations
We envisage that self representations would enter into the assess-
ment of proximal gains in the light of long-term outcomes; for
example, “What sort of person am I, if I treat the other player
like this?”; “If that’s the sort of person I am, how am I likely
to be treated in the future?” This extension of the simple model
above will be crucial if the other makes inferences about the self.
Our long-term aim, test the hypothesis that the normative role of
self-representation is to predict the likely outcomes of social inter-
actions, is likely to require such complex thinking. We envisage
that beliefs about the opponent can, through conditional depen-
dencies among Bayesian estimates about me and my opponent,
affect beliefs about me. This may be crucial for understanding
psychopathology in interpersonal exchange.
Model parameterization
We discussed above that interpersonal, affectively charged repre-
sentations may be parameterized in a number of related ways. We
chose a very simple parameterization for the purposes of demon-
stration. In the light of a wider literature, the validity of different
models for interpersonal representation and the relationships
between them remain to be clarified. One important contribu-
tion of formal models, of the sort we have introduced here, is that
they can provide quantitative predictions of choice behavior. In
principle, this means that one can use observed choices to esti-
mate the parameters of a given model and—more importantly—
use Bayesian model comparison to adjudicate between different
forms or hypothetical schemes.
SUMMARY
In conclusion, we have sketched an elementary model of self and
other representation during interpersonal exchange; within which
these representations have important functional roles. We have
seen that it is fairly straightforward to place optimal decision
schemes in an active inference framework. This involves replacing
optimal policies, defined by utility functions, with prior beliefs
about outcomes. The advantage of doing this is that one can
formulate action and perception as jointly minimizing the same
objective function, which provides an upper bound on surprise
or (negative log Bayesian) model evidence. This enables optimal
control to be cast as a pure inference problem, with a clear dis-
tinction between action and inference about (partially) observed
outcomes. Using a simple example, we have demonstrated how
desirable goals can embody and express prosocial preferences as
well as beliefs about the type of an opponent. Specifically, we have
shown how these beliefs can be updated during iterated play and
how they can guide interpersonal choices. Although rudimen-
tary, these simulations illustrate a formal basis for interpersonal
inference.
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